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SUMMARY AtiD CONCLUSIONS
This report presents the results of a risk assessment study conducted on two
of the technology aircraft described in Report MDC A3440, Volume II: New Airframe
and Sabreliner. It wds determined that both aircraft would have a "Low to Minor"
risk in achieving the program objectives. These results also apply to the other
configurations; i.e., Composite and Voodoo, because the major contributors to risk
were the newer technology items that are essentially common for all.
The aircraft system components were reviewed and assessed for risk based on:
1) complexity relative to state-of-the-art, 2) manufacturing and qualification
testing, 3) availability and delays, and, 4) cost/schedule impact. These assess-
ments were based on five risk nomenclatures: low, minor, moderate, high, and
extreme. It was determined that only the first three ratings were applicable and
their definition is as follows:
• LOW - Fully developed
• MINOR - Current state-of-the-art; significant testing but not fully
developed
• MODERATE - Feasibility well established but limited test experience; no
serious difficulties expected.
Each aircraft system was then assigned an overall risk rating depending upon
its contribution to the capability of the aircraft to achieve the performance goals
of Attachment I to the Statement of Work. This risk rating was then modified to
account for any excess performance margin provided by the MCAIR designs. The New
Airframe and Sabreliner performance margins, as discussed in Report MDC A3440,
Volume II, are illustratca in Figures 1 and 2.
The slightly lower Sabreliner performance margin is due to the restricted
flight envelope, the fixed landing gear and internal fuel capacity. The Sabreliner
with retractable gear and allowed to fly at its best speed and altitude would re-
flect performance margins similar to the New Airframe. These significant margins,
inherent with the MCAIR three gas generator/three fan propulsion system, are major
modifiers to risk assessment of both aircraft.
The estimated risk and the associated key system and performance areas are
tabulated below. The risks are relative to current state-of-the-art and modified
by design and performance margins.
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FIGURE 1
AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE MARGINS
Aircraft New
Reqmt Sabreliner Airframe
-30 Min 37 39
VTOL
CIRCUIT
,lu 5 Circ 7 8
,L60 Min 49 63
STOL
CIRCUIT
%11 Circ 10 13
STO 2 hr 2.7 4.2
CRUISE/ENDURANCE T.O.S.
• VTOGW Limited to 28,000 lb for Hover Safety
• Payload - 2500 lb
FIGURE 2
ATTITUDE CONTROL POWER MARGINS
Percent of
Guideline Requi ements
Roll Pitch Yaw
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SYSTEMS RISK AREAS
System	 Key Areas	 Program Risk
Propulsion	 Thrust Vectoring; Nozzle Area Control 	 Minor
Flight Control	 Attitude Control, Systems Interfacing 	 Low
Flight Control Avionics 	 Redundancy Management	 Minor
PERFORMANCE RISK AREAS
Category	 Key Areas	 Risk Rating
Handling Qualities	 Ground Effects; Engine-Out Control 	 Low to Minor
Stability	 Hover, Low Speed and Cruise	 Minor
Performance	 Attachment I Goals 	 Low to Minor
The overall risk rating for system complexity as related to MCAIR design goals
was determined to be "Low to Moderate" with the "Moderate" rating being associated
with the Flight Control, Propulsion and Flight Control Avionics. The risk rating
for aircraft performance capability was also "Low to Moderate" when related to MCAIR
performance goals. These risk ratings were then modified based on the performance
margins available and the resulting rating was "Low to Minor" for achieving the
Attachment I requirements. The areas of manufacturing/qualification testing,
availability/delay and cost/schedule impact were assessed a rating of "Low to Minor".
The overall program rating related to Attachment I of the Statement of Work goals
was estimated to be "Low to Minor" and is illustrated in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3
PROGRAM RISK ASSESSMENT
SYSTEM COMPLEXITY
"LOW TO MODERATE"	 PERFORMANCE
MARGIN EFFECT
	
ACHIEVE MCAIR PERFORMANCE GOALS
	
"LOW TO MINOR"
"LOW TO MODERATE"
I
MFG/QUAL TEST i
"LOW TO MINOR" I
AVAILABILITY/DELAY 	 OVERALL PROGRAM
"LOW TO MINOR"	 RISK ASSESSMENT
"LOW TO MINOR"
I
COST/SCHEDULE
"LOW TO MINOR"
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" SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACS Active Control System
Alr Aircraft
AC Alternating Current
Av/Del Availability/Delay
t
A'F Airframe
3
AM Amplitude Modulation
-	
= CFE Contractor Furnished Equipment
Cir Circuits
t
DC Direct Current
ETaC Energy Transfer and Control
ft feet
G.E. General Electric
Gen. Generator
GEE Government Furnished Equipment
hr Hours
IFF Identification Friend or Foe
_ L/C Lift/Cruise
lb. Pounds
L.H. Left Hand
Man Manufacturing
MCAIR McDonnell Aircraft Company
Min Minutes
PGM Program
Psi Pounds per square inch
Qual Qualification Testing
.= R&D Research and Development
R.H. Right Hand
Sabr Sabreliner
SCM Signal Conversion Mechanism
} S/0 Shut Off
STO Short Take-Off
SYS System
} T Technology
T.O.S. Time On Station
TRM Thrust Reduction Modulation
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T/W Thrust to Weight
UHF Ultra High Frequency
Vol Volume
V/STOL Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing
VTO Vertical Takeoff
VTOGW Vertical Takeoff Gross Weight
W.T. Wind Tunnel
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1. INTROLUCTION
The objective of this Risk Assessment study was to determine the potential
risks of developing two V/STOL technology aircraft defined as New Airframe and
Sabreliner. This report defines the risk and presents the rationale and procedures
used in the study. Risk is defined as the probability that a desired event will
not be attained as planned by following the present or postulated course of action.
The assessment consisted of five tasks:
1. An evaluation of complexity and identification of potential risk items
relative to the state-of-the art.
2. An evaluation of the potential risk to achieve the performance goals
and guidelines of Attachment I of the Statement of Work.
3. Discussion of potential risk associated with the manufacturing and
qualificatio:: testing.
4. Discussion of the risk associated with the availability and delays in
delivery of necessary materials and off-the -shelf components.
5. A discussion of the probable cost trends and schedule impact of items
judged to have a potential cost escalation risk.
The general arrangement of the New Airframe designed for the technology air-
craft is shown in Figure 4, and that of the Sabreliner is shown in Figure 5. The
three fans and three gas generators are interconnected into a duct and valve system
identical in concept for both aircraft. The thrust vectoring and control systems
are also essentially identical.
Achievement of low risk in new design is a growth process highly sensitive to
the degree that design is guided and verified by both development and reliability
1=
	
	
testing. Further, wherever existing systems, equipment, and components meeting or
exceeding design requirements can be effectively utilized, risk can be significantly
reduced through judicious selection and careful review plus elimination of known
functional failure modes or their effects. Alternatively, selection of equipment
whose design capabilities will be exceeded in a new application increases risk, the
^.
	
	
degree depending on the amount of encroachment on safety factors, the nature of
modifications, the duty cycles involved, and the sensitivity of the program's
objectives to the particular items. Trading design characteristics of one type
for another would also normally increase risk but probably to a lesser amount.
The risk assessment summarized in th is report included the following elements:
o Evaluation of configuration complexity
l
	 o Determination of systems relative importance
3 `	 A*l^OM1M^LL MAfCRAPT LOGO MP"
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FIGURE 4
NEW AIRFRAME
Wing Fuel Tank(7870 lb)
Fuselape Fuel Tank
/— t3= IN
40.7 h
Volume 450 h31
50.1 h
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FIGURE 5
MODIFIED SABRELINER (T-34)
WITH EJECTION SEATS
Wing Fuel Tank
'	 (38901b)
Fuulaoe Fuel Tank
(54101b)
no
44.64 ft
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• Estimate of environmental capabilities
• Examination of systems and component interfacing
• Comparison of systems and components with state-of-the-art
• Establishment of basic system risks
• Determination of basic program technological risk
• Potential manufacturing and testing risks
• Impact of probable cost trends and schedules
• Effect of availability and delivery delays.
Each system w,is examined to determine the number of components, their com-
plexity, and their functions relative to current state-of-the-art. In addition
the number, type, and function(s) of systems and component interfacing were de-
termined relative to current state-of-the-art. Capability of systems and
corroborating information were then considered to determine margins over basic
requirements. The depth of these evaluations was consistent with the constraints
of time and funding. Systems were then reviewed to determine the level of design
and operating experience of similar items; i.e., relationship to state-of-the-art,
and how critical the items were.
In performing the risk assessment, each known component was viewed from five
different viewpoints:
• Quantity
• Physical complexity
• Functional complexity
• State-of-the-art technology
o Environment.
These viewpoints were then combined in assessing component and system risks in four
categories:
• Technology (complexity relative to state-of-the-art)
• Manufacturing
• Qualification testing
• Availability and delay.
Technology was then modified by design margins and, with the remaining categories,
resolved into an assessment of the risk in achieving program objectives. Results
showing unmodified risk in each category for each component are shown in Appendix A.
In judging the degree of risk related to any item, five general categories of risk
were used; these are shown and defined in Figure b.
asCWCWV^ t.L AiMmwrr c owtamw
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FIGURE 6
RISK NOMENCLATURE
Rating Definition
Low Risk o Fully developed
o In use on current aircraft
o Many operating hours/cycles in similar environment
Minor Risk c Current state-of-the-art; significant testing
but not fully developed
Moderate Risk o Feasibility well established but limited test
experience; no serious difficulties expected
High Risk o Similar to programs having serious difficulties
Extreme Risk o Quantum advance
o Feasibility unknown
o High number of serious difficulties anticipated
but not well defined
l ^
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2. CONFIGURATION COMPLEXITY RELATIVE TO STATE-OF-THE-ART
The New Airframe and Sabreliner were reviewed to the lowest detail available
to determine system and component complexity relative to the present day state-of-
the-art. The design details are consistent with the current phase of the develop-
ment cycle. Systems for both aircraft were determined to be well within the
state-of-the-art except for minor deviations in the Propulsion, Flight Control and
Avionics systems. Initially systems were analyzed from the viewpoint of meeting
FAIR defined design goals. These risk assessments were then modified based on
the design and performance margins discussed in Report MDC A3440, Volume II, to
determine overall program risk. The system risk ratings are summarized in
Figure 7.
This task contt:ited of review of systems and elements from the viewpoints of
quantity, physical ,ovtrlexity, functional complexity, design state -of-the-art and
environment. A taa.:iar summary of these risk ratings are presented in Appendix A.
Those components and systems contributing risks greater °',an "Minor", based on
MCAIR goals, are summarized in Figure 8. The Flight Control and eropulsion systems
were reviewed in detail from performance viewpoints; the results are summarized in
Figures 9 and 10. Each of the aircraft systems are discusse d) in the following
paragraphs relative to state:-of-the-art. These discussions apply to both aircraft
exce; c as noted.
Airframe complexity of both aircraft is considered "Low" risk and within the
state-of-the-art of current aircraft. Provisions for incorporation of the forward
fan and the ETaC system pose no unusual problems and may be compared to a con-
ventional three turbofan engine aircraft. For the Sabreliner, the wing poses a
slight additional risk in repoeitioning the main landing gear outboard, b^.t is
well within the state -of-the-art. The Sabreliner is of slightly greater risk
which is inherent with any substantial airframe modification and uncertainty of
the aircraft's condition due to prier flight experiences.
Cockpit system is "Low" risk state-vf-the art complexity for both configura-
tions. The optional Sabreliner modification to accom=idate election seats is also
considered "Low" risk due to use of existing components.
Landing Gear systems are also well within state-of-the -art complexity and a
"Low" risk item for both aircraft, since they are existing components from the A-4
aircraft. The fixed gear on the Sabreliner configuration presents slightly less
risk than the retractable gear of the New Airframe configuration.
wsa000es M& AAWW ery
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FIGURE 7
DESIGN MARGIN EFFECTS ON RISK
SYSTEMS
RISK VS
MCAIR GOALS
DESIGN/PERFORMANCE
MARGIN
NET
RISK
Airframe Low Normal Low
Cockpit Low Normal Low
Landing Gear Low Normal Low
Flight Control Moderate Excess Control Low
Power/Redundancy
Propulsion Mcderate Excess T/W Minor
Air Conditioning/Pressurization Low Normal Low
Electrical Low Redundancy Low
Lighting Low Normal Low
Hydraulic Low Redundancy Low
Fuel Low Normal Low
Oxygen Low Normal Low
Instruments Minor Normal Minor
Avionics Moderata Redundancy Minor
Ratings apply to both aircraft
INCOOAftWLL AmcwAir COMPANY
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FIGURE 8
COMPONENT COMPLEXITY RISK RELATIVE TO STATE-OF-THE-ART
FLIGHT CONTROL Risk
Yaw Control Actuation, Nose Fan Moderate
Interfaces, Nose Fan Control Moderate
Yaw Control Actuation, L/C Fan Moderate
Thrust Vectoring Nozzle Actuation Moderate
Interfaces, L/C Fan Moderate
PROPULSION
ETaC Ducting end Valves Moderate
Thrust Vectc • '.gig Nozzle Moderate
AVIONICS
Redundancy Management Moderate
FIGURE 9
RISK !ASSESSMENT
FLIGHT CONTROL RELATED TO MCAIR GOALS
Technology Existing Development
Aircraft
Performance
Estimated Risk
New
Item Technology Test Sensitivity Airframe Sabreliner
Control Law Model 253 Simulation Man-in-the-Loop Flight High Minor Minor
Development Results Simulation
Powered Lift Control J971ETsC Full Scale ETeC Development and Moderate Moderate Moderate
System Development Test Results Full Scale Propulsion
System Integration
Tests and Flight
Simulation
Motion Sensors F-4	 (SFCS),	 F-15, F-16, Wind Tunnel Tests, Moderate Minor Minor
Development Space Shuttle System Integration
Tests, and Simulation
Active Control F-4	 (SVCS). F-15, F-16, Simulation and System High Minor Minor
System Development Space Shuttle, NASA F-S Integration Tests
Program
Thrust Vectoring MCA1R/NASA Development 36" Thrust Vectoring High Moderate Moderate
System Development Test Results Testa.
ETaC System J97 ETaC Teat ...Zts	 I 1d Flay Testa and High Minor Minor
Development Itional t all Scale
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Flight Control system was initially rated "Minor" to "Moderate" risk; however,
control margins for the New Airframe of 230, 360 and 240 percent of roll, pitch
anti yaw requirements, respectively, effectively reduce the risk to a "Low" rating
relative to effect on program risk. Similar Sabreliner control margins are 200,
280 and 170 percent, respectively. Generally, risk is attributed to system size,
complexity, complexity of interfacing and the amount of testing required to achieve
reasonable confidence. No appreciable difference exists between the two aircraft
configurations. System redundancy minimizes the risk to the program from a safe
flight viewpoint.
Anticipated development areas are control law derivation, system mechanization,
Active Control System (ACS) design and derivation of flow paths and local flows
for central air data computer probes. Detailed simulation runs and three-degree-of-
freedom rig tests will serve to reduce risk. A summary of the flight control system
risk assessment as related to MCAIR goals is shown in Figure 9.
Propulsion system is more complex than conventional aircraft applications due
to integration/interfacing of control el,:ments and is rated "Moderate" risk. The
Sabreliner configuration has higher risk regarding lift cruise engine reingestion
because the inlet length was reduced to provide cabin access. The vectoring range/
efficiency of the forward fan louver system may have slightly less risk than the
New Airframe because of nose landing gear positioning. The New Airframe was assigned
a higher risk in the following areas primarily due to the high speed envelope:
o Fan inlets for high speed cruise performance
• Lift engine inlet location
• Thrust vector nozzle high speed cruise thrust coefficient.
A summary of the propulsion risk assessment related to MCAIR goals is shown in
Figure 10.
Lnvironmental Control system complexity lies completely within the state-of-
the-art and is "Low" risk; both the New Airframe and Sabreliner configurations will
use the same system.
Electrical Power system has low complexity and is rated "Lz)w" risk. Both
aircraft have similar systems.
Lighting system is a very simple system for both aircraft and is rated "Low"
risk.
Hydraulic Power system is of the conventional type using existing components
and is rated "Low" risk.
mc&mwNELL A/RCRAFT COMPANY
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Fuel system and Oxygen system consist of typical state-of-the-art complexity
for both aircraft, and are rated "Low" risk.
All but five items are "Low" risk/state-of-the-art complexity in the Instru-
ment system. The stability augmentation panel is slightly more complex than state-
of-the-art and rated as "Minor" risk. Four items (vector angle indicator, angle
of attack, fan vibration/amplitude and fan RPM) are considered "Minor" risk because
of required modifications or being in current development.
Avionics for the Flight Control system is rated "Moderate" risk related to
MCAIR design goals due to the redundancy management area. Other key areas such as
computers, monitoring and interfaces are rated "Minor" risk. The remaining system
elements are rated "Low" risk. The overall system rating when converted to program
risk is changed to "Minor" due to inherent design margins and use of similar/
identical critical components which are either in use or being developed for programs
which may precede the technology demonstrator.
Avionics equipment was carefully chosen to minimize cost and risk to program
objectives. The quantity and complexity are consistent with the technology program
objective - no "mission" avionics are carried. For example, communications,
'	 identification and radio navigation equipment are minimums for close-to-field
operations and are consistent with safe flight.
MCOOA/NELL AIRCRAFT COMPANY
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3. PERFORMANCE RISK
The aircraft were evaluated to determine the potential risk in achieving the
performance goals and guidelines of Attachment I to the Statement of 'cork. The
initial step was to ascertain the risk for the performance elements involved as
related to state-of-the-art. These risk estimates were then modified due to the
available performance and control margins described in Report MDC A3440, Volume II,
to establish the risk associated with meeting the specified program goals. A
summary of these risks by element is illustrated in Figure 11. The risk in
achieving the overall performance goals is rated "Low to Minor". The elements
associated with the risk analysis are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Handling qualities of the aircraft are dependent on the attitude control power
and system response. Excess control power is available and the ETaC/TRM redundancy
provides for aircraft safety, as discussed in Volume II. Adequate control response
is available for both powered lift and aerodynamic flight. The key elements analyzed
were: thrust modulation, ACS, ground effects, gyroscopic moments, crosswind trim,
control surface effectiveness, and trim moment balance. This area of attitude con-
trol power for powered lift was rated as "Minor to Moderate". After consideration
of the control power margin available, the risk was rated "Low to Minor". The
flight path control power analysis resulted in the same risk rating as the attitude
control power. Elements analyzed were: engine out T/W effects, acceleration
capability, ground effects, stall characteristics, and control system effectiveness.
The aircraft stability characteristics were assessed for hover, low speed, and
cruise conditions and the estimated risk is "Minor". Elements considered in
evaluating the stability were: ACS, ground effects, surface effectiveness, yaw-roll
coupling in transition, drag, stall patterns, post stall roll characteristics, angle
of attack stability, and directional stability.
V/STO performance capabilities were assessed to be "Minor" on the New Airframe
and "Minor to Moderate" for the Sabreliner. The Sabreliner risk rating is slightly
higher due to the unknowns associated with the fan nacelle/wing integration. This
rating would be improved after appropriate wind tunnel tests. The elements con-
sidered were: vector system deflection rate and schedule, climb-out gradient for
both normal and engine out, ground effects, powered induced lift, and stabilator
effectiveness.
M000P~LL AincwApr COMPANY
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Conversion characteristics were assessed to be a "Minor" risk for both air-
craft. A speed higher than the 160 knots specified for the Sabreliner was con-
sidered to assure adequate velocity overlap in conversion. The elements considered
were: buffet onset, lift coefficients, vectoring efficiencies, velocity overlap,
power effects, and stabilator effectiveness at conversion speed.
The mission performance demonstration capabilities were assessed as "Low"
risk for the New Airframe due to the excess performance available for the VTO
circuit, STO circuit, and cruise/endurance missions. The Sabreliner was rated
"Low to Minor" because of a lower performance margin. This rating would be re-
duced to "Low" by us 4.ng a retractable gear and flying at optimum speed and altitude.
This change should be considered for the Sabreliner.
AVCOOAMIWLL AxwcnA/T COMAANY
14
MDC A3440
Volume II
Addendum 2
4. MANUFACTURING AND QUALIFICATION TESTING
This task was to assess the potential risk associated with the manufacturing
and qualification testing of the components identified by Task 1 and shown in
Figure 8. All of the components were rated "Low to Minor" risk except the thrust
vectoring nozzle and the ETaC ducting which were rated "Moderate".
The forming of the thrust vectoring nozzle poses moderate difficulty because
of the combination of size and materials (titanium and honeycomb structure). MCAIR
is well experienced with fabrication of smaller parts made of these materials and a
anticipates no serious problems.
The "cool wall" metal duct design is considered slightly higher than state-
of-the-art due to assembly techniques. The expansion section is a bellows which
slightly exceeds state-of-the-art fabrication techniques. These items could be
reduced to a "Minor" risk rating if a composite duct was used which required no
bellows. The composite duct is currently in development.
No particularly difficult problems are expected in qualification testing of
the above items, but the extensive interface testing creates more opportunity
for test difficulties. The ratings apply only to the present time when practically
all development testing lies ahead. As testing proceeds, risk will diminish as
system cha:-acteristics are established with more certainty.
Qualification testing of the ducting poses no unusual or difficult problems
and is considered "Minor" risk.
Testing of the thrust vectoring nozzle is rated "Moderate" risk because of the
functional complexity. No unusual problems are anticipated since subscale and
full scale boiler plate tests will provide basic experience well ahead of qualifi-
catin;Z testing.
The austere flight test program creates some risk relative to program objec-
tives. The risk pertains to completing the program within the basic constraints
of time and funding, and in this context is highly sensitive to annoyance type
failures and problems which in a lengthier program could be more easily absorbed.
The risk ratings for manufacturing and qualification testing of the components
identified in Task 1 are summarized in Figi:re. 12. Risk ratings for all components
are shown in detail in Appendix A. Risk ratings were also determined for all
systems and are summarized in Figure 13.
MCOCW~LL AfRCRAFr COMPANY
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FIGURE 12
MANUFACTURING AND QUALIFICATION?
TESTING RISK
Manufacturing
Qualific.tion
Testin
FLIGHT CONTROL
ETaC Control Minor Minor
Yaw Control Actuation, Nose Fan Minor Low
Interfaces, Nose Fan Control Minor LOW
Yaw, Control Actuation, L/C Fan Minor Minor
Thrust Vectoring Nozzle Actuation Minor Minor
Interfaces, L/C Fan Minor Low
PROPULSION
Fwd. Fan Louvers Performance Minor Minor
ETaC Ducting b Valves Moderate Moderate
Thrust Vectoring Nozzle Moderate Moderate
AVIONICS
Redundancy Management Minor Minor
FIGURE 13
SYSTEM MANUFACTURING AND QUALIFICATION TEST RISK
SYSTEM NEW AIRFRAME SABRELINER
QUALIFICATION QUALIFICATION
MANUFACTURING TEST MANUFACTURING TEST
Airframe Minor Low Minor Minor
Cockpit Low Low Low Low
Landing Gear Low Low Low Lew
Flight Controls Minor Low Minor Low
Propulsion Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
Air Cond/Pressurization Loa Low Low Low
Electrical Low Low Low Low
Lighting Low Low Low Low
Hydraulic Power Low Low Low Low
Fuel System Low Low Low Low
Oxygen Low Low Low Luw
Instruments Low Low Low Low
Avionics Minor Minor Minor Minor
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUAD	
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5. EFFECT OF AVAILABILITY AND DELIVERY DELAYS
None of the items reviewed in this stud y is estimated to have more than minor
risk of delaying the program because of availability or delivery delays. The
components, equipment, and material selected to construct all technology aircraft
configurations are in general readily available, and therefore low risk relative to
_	 availability. Major airframe components such as the A-6 forward fuselage and
horizontal tail should present no problems; likewise, availability of the A-4
landing gear has low risk, since both these aircraft have been produced in large
quantity. In the case of the Sabreliner, which has also been produced in large
numbers as the T-39, a "Minor" risk is anticipated. Further, the F-101 empennage
presents no schedule problems. Airframes will utilize standard inventory sheet
metal.
"Minor" risk exists in delivery of critical items in the ETaC Control, Lift/
Cruise Fan interfaces, and flight control avionics. "Minor" risk is estimated for
the lift fan assemblies and gas generators, both of which are GFE. With the broad
choices of GFE and CFE off-the-shelf equipment available, and the operational
design margins employed, schedule delay is considered a low probability.
A complete list of items showing potential risk of availability or delay is
shown in Appendix A, Column AV/Del. The summary of the system effects are shown
in Figure 14.
1
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}
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FIGURE 14
SYSTEMS AVAILABILITY/DELAY RISK
SYSTEM
NEW , 'RFRAML
AVAILABILITY DELAY
SABRELINER
AVAILABILITY/DELAY
Airframe Low Minor
Cockpit Low Low
Landing Gear Low Low
Flight Controls Minor Minor
Propulsion Minor Minor
Air Cond /Pressurization Low Low
Electrical Low Low
Lighting Low Low
Hydraulic Power Low Low
Fuel System Low Low
Oxygen Low 7-^w
Instruments Low Low
Avionics Minor Minor
A@czH7 W1WLL AmmcnAFT COMtMNY
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6. GENERAL COST TRENDS AND SCHEDULE IMPACT
Complex and/or high risk programs tend to depart from published schedules and
estimated costs. Schedule delays are frequently the result of technical difficulties
associated with the level of risk. Schedule delays affect overall program costs in
several ways:
1. The direct cost of solving the particular technical problem.
2. The overhead costs remain relatively fixed and these costs continue to
accumulate until particular functions Have been completed.
3. Only a part of the personnel costs can be "shut off" when there is a
technical delay. For example, some items in the design release process
would be delayed by delays in wind tunnel tests. Personnel costs would
increase in both design and wind tunnel tests since t:ie number of people
on a particular function can not be changed to meet every contingency.
While some control is possible, continuity of effort requires a degree
of personnel stability in order to solve challenging technical problems.
4. Unpredictable costs may be incurred in complex high risk programs when
it is necessary to obtain the servi•
	 of specialists in new areas of
technology.
5. The anticipated effects of inflation will tend to be mo.e severe when
programs are delayed and/or stretched out.
In recognition of the relations between risk, schedule delays and costs, the
MCAIR approach has been conservative whenever possible. For example, existing
components have been used wherever possible in flight control systerr-. Risk has
been assumed only where it is essential
	 achieving an airworthy technology
aircraft.
The components, systems, and interfaces judged to have a potential risk or
increasing cost o •
 schedule in developing 3n airwortthv technology aircraft are
as follows:
o	 The Sabreliner airframe due to uncertaint y of its condition 1 considered
a "Moderate" risk.
o	 The flight control system for both aircraft due to the quantity of inter-
faces and required integration. This risk is rated "Moderate".
MCOO AMLt AAWCMAFr cOMwnruvr
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o	 The thrust vectoring nozzle due to its effect on performance is rated
"Moderate" for cost and "Minor" for schedule. These rAt ings shculd reduce
to "Low to Minor" after current planned testing by NASA I , • completed.
The airframe risk for the Sabreliner is primarily associated with the condition
of the model and amc. , nt of work required to reposition the main landing gear out-
board. It has been estimated that tk ,e work affected by the risk is a negligible
amount and a small part of the total program cost. The planning costs are reason-
abie for the work anticipated. However, this portion of the costs could increase
if there are unanticipated difficulties with the particular airframe and/or with
the repositioning of the main landing gear. The schedule for this work is flexible
enough to allow for reasonable difficulties. However, there is a moderate risk of
schedule slippage if extensive structural rework should be required. Schedulc
slippage would cau„:e indirect effects on other costs as previously discussed.
It is estimated that about 25 percent of the flight control system costs are
directly affected by items which involve a moderate risk. As far as the total
program cost is concerned, the highest risk is in schedule slippage. The cost
estimates and schedules are considered reasonable for the risk anticipated. How-
ever, the planning costs do not include any contingency for schedule slippage.
The propulsion system is considered to be "Low” risk; Fowever, there is a
"Moderate" risk associated with the thrust vectoring nozzle. This risk is based
on the uncertainty of functional coordination and respo-se accuracies. The Large
Scale Powered Model tests and Thrust Vectoring teSL^: :ill be completed in the near
future and these results will reduce the risk rating to "Low to Minor".
w9C12O^" L&. AWCAWAFT cc&WWAar
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APPENDIX A
COMPONENT RISK SUMMARY
This appendix summarizes all systems and components that were reviewed in this
study and shows risk ratings for them in four categories designated as follows:
Risk Category	 Sym:)o1
Technology	 Tech
Manufacturing	 Man
Qualification Testing
	 Qual
Availability/Delay	 Av/Del
The technology category integrates five elements:
• Quantity
• Physical Complexity
• Functional Complexity
• State-of-the-art Technology
• Environment
The funccienal complexity and state-of-the-art technology were considered most
important.
M,..;i:c^turing risk relates only to manufacturing problems, the readiness of
soluticri	 unusualness of the item/state-of.-the-art relative to manufacture.
Qualification test risk considers only the problems/solutions involved with
the test. State-of-the-art here considered only the nature of the test and the
tests themselves. All tests are included under this title.
Availability and delay pertains to potential risk of the item not being
available at the scheduled time.
The meaning of the risk ratings assigned are as follows:
Rating	 Definition
Low Risk (L)	 o Fully developed.
o In use on current aircraft
o Many operating hours/cycles in similar environment
Minor Risk (M)	 o Current state-of-the-art; significant testing but not
fully developed
i
Moderate Risk (Mod)	 o Feasibility well established but limited test experience;
no serious difficulties expected
MCOONNELL A/RCRAi7 COMPDONY
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High Risk (H)
Extreme Risk (E)
MDC A3440
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o Similar to programs having serious difficulties
o Quantum advance
o Feasibility unknown
o High number of serious difficulties anticipated but not
well defined.
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SYSTEM RISK
SUBSYSTEM/ITEM NEW AIRFRAME SABRELINER
Tech Man Qual Av/Del Tech Man Qual Av/Del
AIRFRAME L M L L L M M M
FUSELAGE L L L L L L L M
Basic Shell L L L L L L L L
Stiffeners L L L L L L L L
Forward Fuselage M M L M M M L M
Radome L L L L L L L L
Nose L L L L L L L L
Lift Fan Mount M L M L M L M L
Center Fuselage L M L L L M M M
Nose Gear Provisions L M L L L L L L
Wing Area L L L L L M M M
Fuel Provisions L L L L L M L L
Air Inlet Duct M M M M M M M M
Engine Mounts L L L L L L L L
Engine Provisions L L L L M L M L
Auxiliary Inlet Doors L L L L L L L L
Aft Fuselage M M L L M L L L
Fan Doors M L L L M L L L
Fan Area M L L L M L L L
Fan Nacelle M L M M M L L L
Mounts M L L M M L L M
3rd Engine Doors M L L L M L L L
3rd Engine Inlet M L L L M L L L
Tail Provisions M M M L M M L L
WING L M L L L L L L
Leading Edge L L L L L L L L
Torque Box L L L L L L L L
Trailing Edge L L L L L L L L
Fairing L L L L L L L L
Landing Gear Doors L L L L L L L L
VERTICAL TAIL L L L L L L L L
Leading Edge L L L L L L L L
Torque Box L L L L L L L L
Trailing Edge L L L L L L L L
110RIZ014TAL TAIL L L L L L L L L
Leading Edge L L L L L L L L
Torque Box L L L L L L L L
Trailing Edge L L L L L L L L
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SYSTEM RISK
NEW AIRFRAME SABRELINER
SUBSYSTEM/ITEM Tech Man Qual Av/Del Tech Man Qual Av/Del
COCKPIT L L L L L L L L
Windshield L L L L L L L L
Canopy L L L L L L L L
Mechanism L L L L L L L L
Cockpit Provisions L L L L L L L L
Floor L L L L L L L L
Ejection Provisions L L L L L L L L
Seats L L L L L L L L
Consoles L L L L L L L L
Ejection Sequence L L L L L L L L
02 Installation L L L L L L L L
Fire Extinguish and Detection L L L L L L L L
MCOONNEC.L A/RCRAiT COMPANY
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SYSTEM RISK
SUBSYSTEM/ITEM NEW AIRFRAME SABRELINER
Tech Man Qual Av/Del Tech Man Qual Av/Del
LANDING GEAR L L L L L L L L
Control Valve L L L L
Emergency Release Handle L L L L
Wheels Warning Light L L L L
Gear Position Indicators L L L L
Gear Control Handle L L L L
Nose Gear
Steering Control Switch L L L L L L L L
Forward Door Latch Cylinder L L L L
Shock Strut L L L L L L L L
Steering Emergency Control L L L L L L L L
Switch
Door Sequence Valve L L L L
Door Filter L L L L
Steering Amplifier L L L L L L L L
Flow Restrictor L L L L L L L L
Steering Control Valve L L L L L L L L
Actuating Cylinder L L L L
Telescoping Mechanism L L L L
Fork L L L L L L L L
Steering Actuator L L L L L L L L
Door Thermal
Relief Valve L L L L
Forward Door Latch Cylinder L L L L
Rolling Assembly L L L L L L L L
Wheel L L L L L L L L
Tire L L L L L L L L
Main Gear
Aft Door Latch Cylinder L L L L
Door Sequence Valve L L L L
Shock Strut L L L L L L L L
Actuating Cylinder L L L L
Relief Valve L L L L
Flow Restrictor L L L L
Aft Door Actuator 11 L L L
Drag Link L L L L L L L L
Forward Door Actuator 11 L L L
Thermal Relief Valve L L L L
Forward Door Latch Cylinder L L L L
Rolling Assembly L L L L L L L L
W11vel L L L L L L L L
Tire L L L L L L L L
Drag Link Locking Cylinder L L L L L L L L
Wheel Brakes L L L L L L L L
Brakes L L L L L L L L
Control Valve L L L I. L L L L
Selector Valve,	 (Manual) L L L L L L L L
Brake Reservoir L L L 1, L L L L
"taster Brake Cylinder L L L L L L L L
MCAMW~LL AmcnAFr ccwwFwNY
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SYSTEM RISK
NEW AIRFRAIME SABRELINER
SUBSYSTEM/ITEM
Tech Man Qual Av /Del Tech Man Qual Av/Del
FLIGHT CONTROL Mod M L M Mod M L M
Cockpit
Control Sticks L L L L L L L L
Linkage L L L L L L L L
Transducers M M M L M M M L
Pedal L L L L L L L L
Transducers M M M L M M M L
Transition Lever L L L L L L L L
Linkage L L L L L L L L
Front Fan
Louvers, Inlet M M M L M M M L
Actuators L L L L L L L L
Linkage L L L L L L L L
Louvers, Yaw and Thrust Vector	 M M M M M M M M
Actuators L L L L L L L L
Linkage L L L L L L L L
SCM L M L M L M L "1
Interfaces M M M M M M M
ETaC Valves M M M L M M M L
Actuators L L L L L L L L
Linkage L L L L L L L L
SCM L M L M L M L M
L/C Fans
ETaC Valves M M M L M M M L
Actuators L L L L L L L L
Linkage L L L L L L L L
SCM L M L M L M L it
Nozzle, Thrust Vector Mod Mod Mod Mod Mod Mod Mod Mod
Actuators L L L L L L L L
TRM Door 14 M M M M "I M M
Actuators L L L L L L L L
SCM L M L M I, M L M
Yaw Vanes Mod M M M Mod :d M M
Actuators L L L L L L L L
Linkage I L L L L L L I.
SCM L M L M L M L M
Interfaces M M M M M M M M
ETaC Isolation Valve L M L "I L M L M
Actuator L L I. I. L L L I.
Linkage L L L L L L L I.
Gas Generator Isolation Valves 	 M M L L M M L L
Actuators L. L L L I. L L L
Linkage L L L L L L L 1,
Interfaces M M M M M M "I M1
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FLIGHT CONTP
Dump Va1Ve
Ac tuatoz
Aileron
Structuz
Actuatox
SCM
Linkage
Interfac
Stabilatoi
Struc tuz
Ac tuatoz
SCM
Linkage
Lnterfac
Rudder
Structui
Actuatoi
SCM
Linkage
Interfac
Flaps
Selector
Ac tuatoi
Flow Dii
Linkage
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SYSTEM RISK
SUBSYSTEM/ITEM NEW AIRFRAME SABRELINER
Tech Man Qual Av/Del Tech Man Qual Av/Del
PROPULSION Mod Mod Mod M Mod Mod Mod M
Gas Generator L L L M L L L M
Controls M M M M M M M M
Lift Fan M M M M M M M M
L/C Fans M M M M M M M M
Air Turbine Starter L L L L L L L L
Forward Fan Duct Mod Mod Mod M Mod Mod Mod M
Interconnect Duct Mod Mod Mod M Mod Mod Mod M
L/C Fan Duct Mod Mod Mod M Mod Mod Mod M
Duct Expansion Sections Mod Mod M M Mod Mod M M
MC00/1M1MLL AmcnAi7 COM/'MIYY
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SYSTEM RISK
SUBSYSTEM/ITEM NEW AIRFRAME SABRELINER
Tech Man	 Qual Av/Del Tech Man Qual Av/Del
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL L L	 L L L L L I,
-`	 Valve,	 Bleed Air S/0 L L	 L L L L L L
Regulator, 18 psi L L	 L L L L L L
Valve, Relief 22-1/2 psi L L	 L L L L L L
Switch, Emergency L L	 L L L L L L
Valve, Emergency L L	 L L L L L L
Control,	 Flow Limiter L L	 L L L L L L
Heat Exchanger L L	 L L L L L L
Turbine, Cooling L L	 L L L L L L
Seal, Door, Air Tank L L	 L L L L L L
Regulator,
	
Door Seal L L	 L L L L L L
H2O Separator L L	 L L L L L L
Sensor, Water Separator L L	 L L L L L L
Valve, Flood Flow L L	 L L L L L L
Valve, Emergency Ram Air L L	 L L L L L L
Connector Ground Air Conditioner L L	 L L L L L L
Chamber, Mixing L L	 L L L L L L
Valve, Hot Air Mix L L	 L L L L L L
w9cvaW,AiaLJL wrwcwwry com~Pwv
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SUBSYSTEM/ITEM
ELECTRICAL
Generators
Panel
Line Contactor
Power Conversion
Transformer/Rectifier
Essential Transformer/
Rectifier
DisLi.jhution
AC Bus
DC Bus
Relay
Essential AC Bus
Essential DC Bus
Diodes
Circuit Breaker
Three Phase Monitor
Fuse
MDC A3440
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RISK
NEW AIRFRAME SABRELINER
Tech Man
	 Qual Av/Del Tech Man Qual Av/Del
L L	 L L L L L L
L L	 L L L L L L
L L	 L L L L L L
L L	 L L L L L L
L L	 L L L L L L
L L	 L L L L L I.
L L	 L L L L L L
L L	 L L L L L L
L L	 L L L L L L
L L	 L L L L L L
L L	 L L L L L L
L L	 L L L L L L
L L	 L L L L L L
L L	 L L L L L L
L L	 L L L L L L
^900430 ~LL A~MAf r C~OIANV
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SYSTEM RISK
SUBSYSTEM/ITEM NEW AIRFRAME
SABRELINER
Tech Man	 Qual Av/Del Tech Man Qual Av/Del
LIGHTING L L	 L L L L L L
-	 Land, Taxi System L L	 L L L L L L
Position Light System L L	 L L L L L L
Anti-Collision System L L	 L L L L i. I.
Interior:
Overhead Dome L L	 L L L L L L
Entrance L L	 L L L L L L
Flood-Consoles, Panels, L L	 L L L L L L
Pedestal
Indirect - Cockpit L L	 L L L L L L
Utility - Cockpit L L	 L L L L L I.
Emergency - Cockpit L L	 L L L L L L
r
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SYSTEM RISK
NEW AIRFRAME SABR,^LINER
SUBSYSTEM/ITEM
Tech Man	 Qual Av/Del Tech Man Qual Av/Del
HYDRAULIC L L	 L L L L L L
Power Control Systems L L	 L L L L L L
I'u-no, Variable Displacement L L	 L L L L L L
Reservoir,	 Soot Strap L L	 L L L L L L
Filter Module L L	 L L L 11 L L
Filters L L	 L L L 11 L L
Relief Valves L L	 L I. L L L L
Pressure Sensors L L	 L L L L L L
Contamination Sampling Valve L L	 L L L L L L
Pressure Indicator, Filter L L	 L L L L L L
Check Valves L L	 L L L L L
Oil Cooler L L	 L I. L L L I.
Fill Valve L L	 L L L L L L
Drain L L	 L L L L L L
Ground Test Fitting L L	 L L L L L L
Plumbing L L	 L L L L L L
Switching Valves L L	 I L L L L L
l
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SYSTEM RISK
SUBSYSTEM/ITEM
NEW AIRFRAME SABRELINER
Tech Man Qual Av/Del Tech Man Qual Av/hel
FUEL L L L L L L L L
Sealant L L I. L
Bladders L L L L
Pumps & Plumbing L L L L
Valve, Vent L L L L
Standpipe L L L L
Valve, S/0, Manual L L L L
Valve, S/0 Level Control L L L L
Valve, S/0 Fuel Line L L L L
Valve, S/0 Engine Manifold L L L L
Pumps, Fuel Transfer, Elect. L L L L
Switch, Pressure L L L L
Hydraulic Heat Exchanger L L L L
Fuel Quantity Probe L L L L
Pressure Relief L L L L
Flow Transmitter L L L L
Flame Arrest L L L L
Valve, Lrain L L L L
Valve, Check, Fuel L L '. L
Valve, Check,	 Hot Air L L L L
Adapter A!-^;embly L L L L
Crossfeed & Tank Selector Switch L 11 L L
Fuel Jettison Switch t. L L L
Fuel Transfer Ejector L 11 1, I.
Left Hand Fuel Boost Pump L L L 1.
Right Hand Fuel Boost Pump 11 L 11 1.
Tank Cross-Feed Valve L 11 L 1,
Fuel .Jettison Level
Control Float Switch L L L I.
Pump Cross-Feed Valve L 1, L t.
Left Hand Fuel Shut-Off "aloe L L L I.
Right Hand Fuel Shut-Off Valve L L 1, L
Pressure Switch 1. 1. 1.
Check Valves 1. L I. 1.
Fuel Jett i son Valves L L 1. '•
Vent Flame Arrestor L L L L
Single Point Refueling t. L I. 1.
Level Control & Vent Valve 1, L 1. 1.
Dual Remote Control L L 1. I_
Shut -off Valve L t.
Single Point Refuel
'Pest L
Receptacle L L L L
Fuselage Tank Refueling
LevelControl Valve L
3rd Engine Fuel boost Pump L L L 1.
3rd Engine Fuel Shut-Off Valve L L 1.
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SYSTEM RISK
SUBSYSTEM/ITEM NEW AIRFRAME SAERELINER
Tech Man	 Qual Av/Del Tech Man Qual Av/Del
OXYGEN (Existing T-39) L L	 L L L L L L
High-Pressure Oxygen L L	 L L L L L L
Storage Cylinder L L	 L L L L L L
High-Pressure
Filler Valve L L	 L L L L L L
Pressure
Sensing Transmitter L L	 L L L L L L
Electrical '-;age L L	 L L L L L L
Pressure Reducer L L	 L L L L L L
Pressure Regulator L L	 L I L L L L
Oxygen Mask L L	 L L L L L L
Flow Indicators L L	 L L L L L L
Ground. Tet t
Push Button L L	 L L L L L L
Manual
Shutoff Valve L L	 L L L L L L
MCOONNELL AIRCRAFT COMPANY
A-15
MDC A3440
Volume II
Addendum 2
SYSTEM
	
RISK
i
SUBSYSTEM/ITEM NEW AIRFRAME
Tech Man Qual Av/Del
INSTRUMENTS M L L L
Attitude Indicator L L L L
Horizontal Situatio_i Indicator L L L L
Mach Airspeed Indicator L L L L
Barometric Altimeter L L L L
Radar Altimeter L L L L
Vector Angle Indicator M L L L
Clock L L L L
Vertical Velocity Indicator L L L L
Flight Control System Panel M L L L
Turn & Slip Indicator L L L L
Accelerometer L L L L
Angle of Attack Indicator M L L L
Angle of Slip Indicator L L L L
Fan:	 Vibration Amplitude M L L L
Speed	 (RPM) L L L L
Engine:	 Speed (RPM) L L L L
Exhaust Gas Temperature L L L L
Fuel Flow L L L L
Oil Pressure L L L L
Flap Position Indicator L L L L
Landing Gear Position Indicator L L L I.
Stabilator Trim Indicator L L L L
Hydraulic Control Panel L L L L
Magnetic Compass L L L L
Cabin Pressure Altitude L L L L
Pressure Control Panel L L L L
Low Airspeed Indicator L L L L
Standby Attitude Indicator L L L L
SABRELINER
Tech Man	 Qual Av/Del
M L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
M 1.	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
M L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
M L	 L L
L L	 L L
M L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
L L	 L L
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SYSTEM RISK
SUBSYSTEM/ITEM NEW AIRFRAME
Tech Man Qual Av/Del
AVIONICS Mod M M M
Communication, Radio Navigation
& Identification
UHF AM Transceiver L L L L
Intercomm L L L L
IFF TRansponder L L L L
TACAN L L L L
Antennas
UHF/L Band L L L L
Transponder L L L L
Navigation
Attitude & Heading M M M L
Magnetic Azimuth Detector L L L L
Air Data System
Air Data Computer M L L L
Pitot Static Probe L L L L
Total Temperature Sensor L L L L
Low Velocity Airspeed System M M M M
Flight Control Computers
Digital Processor M L L M
Digital Memory L L L L
Data Transfer L L L L
Signal Conditioning & L L L L
Conversion
Signal Selection & Voting L L L L
Devices
Cross Channel & In-Line- M L L L
Monitors
Analog Microcircuits L L L L
Power Supply L L L L
Flight Control Software
Development, Verification & M L M `I
Logistics Control
Computational Technique M L L L
Redundancy Management Mod :d M M
Computer Synchronization M L M L
Sensors and Transducers
Motion L L L L
Attitude L L L L
Air Data M L L L
Pilot Controls L L L L
SABRELINER
Tech Man Qual Av/Del
Mod M M M
L L L L
L L L L
L L L L
L L L L
L L L L
L L L L
M II M L
L L L I.
M L L L
L L L L
L L L L
I°i M 't M
Ai L L M
L L L L
L L L L
L L L I.
L L L I.
M L L L
L L L L
L L L L
I1 L `i M
'. f L L L
Mod M 't M
M L M L
L L L L
I, L L L
;i L L L
L L L L
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